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BOOK:
THE MEMORIES of
FRANCESCO CRISPI.
Translated by
MARY PRICHARD-AGNETTI
From the documents
Collected and edited by
THOMAS PALAMENGHI-CRISPI
VOL II
THE TRIPPLE ALLIANCE
LONDON, E.C. MCMXII
Pp 164-7.
CHAPTER V
CRISPI AND THE BULGARIAN QUESTION.
The ministerial crisis of February 1887- Crispi’s attitude; his talks
with the King; his appointment as Minister of the Interior- The
Bulgarian Question and the conduct of the Italian Government before and
after Crispi´s assumption of control of our foreign policy as regards
affairs in the East- Correspondence and documents- Italy proposes and
prevails upon the Powers to accept the non-intervention policy in
Bulgaria- The Triple Alliance for Eastern Affairs.
The ministerial crisis brought about by the awful slaughter at Dogali at
February 8, 1887, was long and strenuous.
The African enterprise, which had been initiated by the landing of
Italian troops at Massaua (February 5, 1885), was to have constituted,
according to Minister Mancini, an indemnification, a reparation as it
were, for the disappointments Italy had suffered, in the Mediterranean.
*Why will you refuse to recognise,` he said at the Chamber on Jan 27,
1885, addressing his opponents, who had accused him losing sight of the
true object of the Italian policy, that is to say, the Medit, ‘that in
the Red Sea, its nearest neighbour, we may find the key to the Medit?’
Italy, alas! Found naught but disaster in the Red Sea, and a fatal
diversion, which Crispi had foreseen from the very beginning, as appears
from the warning he uttered at the Chamber on Jan 29.
If, in 1882, the Hon. Mancini had accepted England’s proposals, he might
now be in position to initiate a policy of colonisation that would rest
upon a solid foundation and from which we might derive true benefit. As
it is, I can only hope, for Italy’s sake that what he has done may not
prove disastrous.
Dogali was the consequence of lightness with which the difficulties
besitting the undertaking were considered, and especially of ignorance
of the true meaning of Abyssinian hostility. At Massaua, General Gene
believed he could hold his own with a handful of men against a whole
army of adversaries; and at Rome, Minister Robiliant called those fierce
tribes, whose lives are spent in continual warfare, a ‘band of
plunderers.’
Upon the resignation of the ministry over which Depretis had presided-
which had been in office since May 29, 1881, and did not enjoy the
confidence of the right-thinking portion of the population- the King
first commissioned Depretis himself to recompose the Cabinet; but on Feb
23 Depretis was obliged to resign his commission. Robilant, Biancheri,
and Saracco, having been requested in turn to undertake the
recomposition of the administration, and having all three declined to
attempt it, the King on March 5 retraced his steps, and decided not to
accept the resignation of the Ministry.
What was Crispi’s attitude during this crisis, which was to end in his
assuming the reigns of government?
We must consult his diary.
On Feb 9 the King summoned him in consultation.
At 9.15 I was at the Quirinal. The King asked my opinion of the
political and parliamentary situations, and displayed anxiety concerning
the condition of the country, the state of Europe and the great
difficulties which encompass us.
I replied: Our position in Europe has certainly not improved during the
last few years. Germany holds aloof from us; Austria may have reasons of
her own for wishing to keep us with her, but she will not prove a
faithful friend. The parliamentary situation could not be worse.
Depretis has created such disorder that not even he himself can count on
the support of the Chamber. The parties are numerous, but not one can
count on a majority. Nevertheless, the party of the Left is the
strongest. The parliamentary confusion can be remedied only by an
administration composed of honest men, chosen amongst the cleverest
members of the Chamber.
The King. – I ask for nothing better, and I beg you to point out the
person to whom I must appeal.
Crispi. – It is not my place to give advise of this sort. It is the duty
of the Prime Minister who has resigned to do so. That is the way it is
done in England.
The King. – I do not wish to exclude any one, and a suggestion might
render my task less difficult. Apropos of this subject, I wish to tell
you that, to my great regret I read in one of today’s papers, that at
court your name is excluded from the list. This is false. Not only do I
entertain great friendship for you personally, but I appreciate your
patriotism, your energy and experience. Nothing would please me more
than to have your name proposed to me, or to find it inscribed upon a
ministerial schedule. I would gladly place you in authority.
Crispi. – I thank Your Majesty for the sentiments you have been pleased
to express concerning me….
The King. – I do not wish it to be believed that I exclude any one.
Crispi. – I cannot doubt that Your Majesty tells me.
The King. – Very well then. Will you kindly tell me how you stand with
Count Robilant?
(continues here)
CHAPTER IX
ANOTHER FRANCO-ITALIAN INCIDENT
PP307-319
The question with France concerning taxation in Massawa; three
diplomatic Notes by Crispi on Italy’s rights and the annoyance caused by
France—The Powers decide in favour of Italy—From Crispi’s diary; Spain
and the Vatican—King Louis of Portugal alarmed concerning our
sovereign’s excursion into Romagna—Crispi pays Prince Bismark a second
visit—The Austrian Grand Chancellor meets Crispi at Eger.
The question of levying a municipal tax upon the inhabitants of
Massowah, both Italians and foreigners, to which de Mouy has alluded,
and which has raised again presently by the French government, was but
another proof of the tendency of France to seek pretexts for quarrelling
with Italy.
Crispi was accused of provocation and of acting in obedience to Prince
Bismark, who wanted war, and also of helping the Triple Alliance to
assume an alarming attitude. For many years the French press, and also
that part of the Italian press which reflects its views, have harped
upon these accusations, and even in certain publications of recent date
Crispi has been described as arrogant, domineering, and over-hasty in
his judgements. (1)
How devoid of foundation such accusations were is clearly demonstrated
by the history of the Massowah taxation incident.
The episode that gave rise to it and the arguments used by Minister
Goblet, Flourens’ successor, for the purpose of preventing Italy from
establishing her sovereignty over the country where so much Italian
blood has already been shed, are set fourth in the documents here
transcribed.
Crispi’s answers to the French objections were contained in three Notes,
two of the twenty-fifth and one of the thirty-first of July, which were
addressed to our ambassadors, to be communicated to the Foreign
Secretaries of the great Powers. We give a synopsis of them here.
In order to meet the expenses of works of hygiene, lighting, etc., the
general in command at Massowah, on the 30th of last May, ordered a tax
ranging from two to seven lire a month, to be levied on all households
and tradesmen residing in Massowah, both Italians and foreigners.
Another decree, issued on June 3, for the same purpose, placed a license
tax on all bars, grocery stores, etc. Twenty-three tradesmen have
refused to pay these taxes, and of this number two are Frenchmen, one a
Swiss, and the other twenty Greeks, who as they have no consul of their
own, enjoy the protection of the French vice-consul, the only foreign
agent in Massowah—such being the state of things we found there at the
moment of our occupation.
The French government upholds them in their refusal, contests our right
to levy taxes on French subjects or on other enjoying French protection,
and appeals to the Capitulations existing in Massowah.
If, for the sake of argument, we accept our opponent’s hypothesis that
the Capitulations really do prevail at Massowah, does it follow that we
may not levy a municipal tax upon foreign subjects and those enjoying
foreign protection without the consent of their government?
Let us see how this matter is arranged in the former Ottoman provinces,
although judicially their position differs widely from that of Massowah,
and also from that of other countries ruled by Capitulations. In
Bosnia-Herzegovina all fiscal and municipal privileges in favour of
foreigners were swept away at the moment of the Austro-Hungarian
occupation. In Cyprus the faculty of taxing foreigners is regulated by
the treaties of commerce with Turkey and not by the Capitulations.
Bulgaria, which has but recently established its municipalities, has
been obliged to levy communal taxes against which the European Powers
have raised no objections.
Egypt has introduced a law subjecting all foreigners to a license tax,
and, up to the present, no government has protested at Cairo. The
Sublime Porte has attempted to apply this license tax within the
boundaries of the Empire, and the representatives of the great Powers,
while recognising that the Capitulations were thereby violated, offered
no opposition to it as a principle, and simply demanded that its
applications be properly regulated. At Tunis, the city government, a
French institution, collects the taxes.
But the premiss that the Capitulations are in force in Massowah is
entirely mistaken. In the first place, Turkey has never held
indisputable sway at Massowah, and the Ottoman courts have never
dispensed justice there. But even had they existed before, they would
have disappeared with the Italian occupation. When a Christian nation
undertakes the administration of the affairs of a Mussulman country, the
Capitulations have no longer any reason to exist. They are alone
possible when great differences in religion, habits, laws and customs
prevail between two peoples, one of whom has taken up its abode in the
territory of the other for purposes of trade. Without exceptionally
strong guarantees from the very moment of the introduction of national
justice, there would be no security for foreigners, either personally or
as regards property. Now such is certainly not the condition of things
in Massowah, where a regular administration, affording all necessary
guarantees of order and impartiality, has been exercising its functions
for the past three years. Moreover, we have established taxes of a
fiscal character at Massowah, such as the harbour, maritime and customs
tax, which all alike have paid, and against which no one has rebelled. A
further anomaly is also worthy of note. The very Greeks who now, in
obedience of pressure and instigation which we must refrain from
qualifying, have refused to pay a tax that is of local importance, have
all recently appealed to Italian justice, or, rather, have accepted its
sentence without demur.
In conclusion, it is perhaps not superfluous to point out that the Greek
government, before its conversion to the French view of the case, did
not seek to base its claims upon the Capitulations, but upon Article II.
Of the treaty of commerce of 1877 between Italy and Greece, wherein it
is set forth that ‘the subjects of either country shall be considered as
being on a footing of perfect equality with the natives, as regards the
payment of taxes.’ The tax in question having been levied alike on the
Italians and Greeks residing at Massowah, Greece was forced to admit
that we were in the right.
We have followed our opponents in the field of debate they themselves
have chosen, and have successfully confuted their arguments; but
discussion is no longer necessary for us, as the sovereignty of Italy at
Massowah is now an accomplished and incontestable fact.
Italy occupied Massowah on Feb. 5, 1885, under circumstances which it is
well to recall.
The alarming progress of the Mahdi’s insurrection had obliged Egypt to
concentrate her forces and call many outlying garrisons. Massowah,
situated beyond the line of defence mapped out by the Khedival
government, had to be evacuated. Turkey refused the invitation to occupy
it, and by this refusal forfeited entirely all those, certainly very
doubtful, rights which she had arrogated to herself in regard to that
important point on the Red Sea.
Thus abandoned, Massowah was exposed to the double peril of invasion by
the Mahdi’s insurrection and by anarchy. It was for the general good
that one of the Powers should occupy the city and defend it if
necessary. Italy was ready; she already possessed a colonial
establishment not far distant, which might also be threatened. The
friendly States accepted the idea of the extension of Italy’s authority
on the shores of the Red Sea without jealousy or animosity, even perhaps
with satisfaction, and so the occupation of Massowah was decided upon.
Not only did Italy occupy Massowah at a time when, owing to the refusal
of the Porte, all rule had ceased there, but she immediately began to
exercise the rights inherent in sovereignty. Not ten months had elapsed
before the public services were all in our hands, while the last traces
of the preceding occupation were rapidly disappearing….The occupation of
Massowah was brought to the knowledge of the great Powers by means of
two despatches, one of the 9th, the other of the 13th of Feb. 1885. . .
The protests, however, do not come from Turkey, who, after some slight
hesitation, accepted the accomplished fact. We need bring forward no
further proof of this than the text of the Suez Canal Convention,
emended by the Porte himself, where, under Article X., it is formally
recognised that Turkey holds no possessions in the Red Sea save those in
the East shore.
As usual the objections come from France, who has succeeded in
attracting Greece within the orbit of her protests; who sees in the
peaceful progress of the Italian nation a lessening of her own power and
authority, as if the African continent did not afford sufficient scope
to all the Powers who occupy its territory for activity and legitimate
ambitions to civilise.
31 July.—The despatch which I addressed to Your Excellency on the 13th
of this month, and the two others of the 25th, which I authorised you to
submit to the Foreign Secretary of the country to which you are
accredited, who has also to be supplied with copies, have, I feel sure,
clearly demonstrated Italy’s right to Massowah, and also shown how
France, without any plausible motive, tried to raise the question of the
Capitulations against us, which may no longer be invoked in that
country, now the property of a Christian and civilised Power.
It now becomes my duty to show what the attitude of the French agents at
Massowah has been since the first moment of our occupation, because the
present difficulties have been brought about by that attitude alone.
In the first place, let it be understood that France is the only Power
which maintains a representative at Massowah, although she has no
commercial interests in that region, and only two subjects residing
there, who trade in a small way, and are but recently arrived.
Under these conditions her reasons for maintaining a representative
cannot be other than political. It is declared that the presence of a
Lazarite Mission in Abyssinia necessitates this representation, but
unfortunately the attitude of the agents points to a very different and
far boarder purpose.
When we occupied Massowah we found no French consular agent there, nor
was it until eight months later, on Oct. 20, 1885, when the Egyptians
had abandoned this locality, leaving us in undisputed possession, that
M. Soumagne arrived, proclaiming himself French vice-consul.
After a simple exchange of civilities with our resident authorities,
instead of cultivating that cordial intercourse with them which alone
could have justified his presence at Massowah, he sought rather to form
ties with Abyssinians. In the following spring he journeyed to Adigrat,
where a meeting took place with Ras Alula, and a few months later, in
August 1886, he was at Adua, visiting King John.
He made no secret of his intimacy with the Negus, describing it to our
commander-in-chief himself, to whom he furthermore confessed that he had
proposed to the King the conclusion of a formal treaty with France. As
we discovered later on from other sources, the most important clause of
this treaty would have been France’s protection for Abyssinia excluding
any other Power.
These secret dealings and schemes between the French Agent, the Negus
and Ras Alula, justified the suspicion that he was plotting against us,
and when he left Massowah in March 1887, for reasons of health, the
authorities experienced a sense of relief, as if an enemy had been
removed.
Unfortunately, however, the conduct of his successor differed in no wise
from his own. This was a certain M Mercinier, who had been clerk at the
French Consulate at Alexandria, and whom M Soumagne presented to our
commander-in-chief, shortly before his departure, as the person
appointed to take temporary charge of the French vice-consulate.
This was the beginning of an uninterrupted series of protests and
difficulties raised by the new French representative, who lost no
opportunity to interfering in the most inconsiderate manner in matters
with which he had no concern. He kept an open register at his office for
inscribing the names of those who desired to be taken under French
protection; and he issued ‘protection papers’ not only to Greeks, but
also to Persians, Turks, Swiss, and even to a North American subject, it
being patent that these ‘protection papers’ were generally granted only
to such as maintained intercourse with our enemies.
It would be superfluous to mention here all the protests and objections
systematically raised by M. Mercinier against nearly every measure
adopted by the Italian authorities in Massowah. He even went the length
of threatening violence against our authorities and of stirring up
resistance and open rebellion, and he has recently done in the matter of
municipal taxes, which were levied alike on all the inhabitants of
Massowah, regardless of nationality. It would also be unavailing to
dwell upon the abuses of authority of which he was frequently guilty,
abuses which reached the point of threatening the inflections of fines,
and even the expulsion from the country of those among the ‘protected’
who should disregard his orders and pay the taxes above mentioned.
The continual and open hostility of the French agent, and the necessity
to maintaining order in a military station and a territory which are
still in a state of war, not only for the benefit of the natives for
whom we are responsible, but also of the foreigners who frequent this
region, have made it impossible for us to tolerate longer the conduct of
M. Mercinier in the position he has assumed of director of the French
vice-consulate. It being impossible to withdraw the exequatur from a
functionary who was temporarily performing the offices of a vice-consul
who himself had not received it from His Majesty’s government, General
Baldissera could only notify him (on July 23) that he must decline to
have any further dealings with him.
I need hardly to point out that M. Mercinier, having thus been reduced
to the position of a private citizen, could no longer communicate with
his government in cipher, this mode of correspondence being strictly
forbidden to all private individuals residing in Massowah.
I consider it necessary that Your excellency should be acquainted with
these particulars that, should occasion present, you may be in a
position to discuss the question intelligently with the Foreign
Secretary of the country to which you are accredited.
As was but natural, Minister Goblet (2) did not yield to the arguments
advanced by the Italian government, and the wrath of the French press
was poured out upon Crispi. But Crispi was inflexible. On being attacked
he defended himself energetically indeed, but without invective. He
carried the contest before the Chancelleries of Europe, demonstrated to
them that France was sustaining a false thesis, and that she was not
moved either by questions of principle or dignity, but rather by rancour
at the spirit of independence by which the Italian policy was animated.
As may be gathered from the following documents, the whole of Europe
recognised the justice of Crispi’s arguments, who, having obtained that
acknowledgment, put an end to the debate by declaring he would answer no
further communications from M. Goblet.
Paris, 25 July, 1888
To-day Goblet has been complaining to me because Your Excellency has as
yet been unable to receive M Gerard, and also because the military
commandant at Massowah has declared to M. Mercinier that he has ceased
to regard him as the representative of France, he being unprovided with
the regular exequatur. It seemed the proper moment for acquainting M.
Goblet with the contents of the last two despatches from Your Excellency
concerning the Massowah incident, but your excellent arguments failed to
disabuse him of his first idea. He persists of quoting the Capitulations
which we do not recognise. And in pretending that all action for levying
the taxes in question should be suspended, a protest having been raised
against them, whereas we hold that there will be time enough to examine
those protests when obedience has been rendered to the governing
authorities. Goblet became more and more excited, and I promptly
declared that owing to our total disagreement on the two all-important
points before mentioned, I could not continue the discussion, which
might lead to undesirable results. Among other things Goblet informed me
that France was disposed to acquiesce in our demands if we, on our part,
would make certain concessions. He did not specify what concessions, but
I concluded he meant to allude to Tunis, as the Austro-Hungarian
ambassador here, who has had an interview with him on the subject, told
me in confidence that, in speaking of Massowah. Goblet had also alluded
to Tunis.
I am assured that much uneasiness is felt at the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs with
regard to Greece, whence no communications have been received for some
days
past…. MENABREA
London, 26 July
Salisbury tells me he has declared to the French Ambassador and to the
German Ambassador as well, that, in the opinion of the English
government, when a Mussulman country comes under the administration of a
civilised, Christian nation, the Capitulations have no further reason to
exist. I proposed to Salisbury the immediate signing of a document
similar to that existing between England and Austria-Hungary, but His
Lordship expressed his confidence that Your Excellency would be
perfectly satisfied with the clear and explicit declaration he had made
to me. CATALANI
Letter from Lord Salisbury to Commendatore Catalini, written on July 29,
1888.
You ask for the opinion of Her Majesty’s government concerning the
Capitulations in countries which, like Massowah, have been under
Mussulman administration but are no longer subject to it.
I reply as follows: Her Majesty’s government denies the validity of the
Capitulations under these circumstances. The Capitulations owe their
origin to the difficulty of adapting the peculiarities of Mussulman law
and administration to the needs of those merchants who trade with
Christian countries. Therefore, in countries which have become subject
to the administration of a Christian government, like that of Italy, the
Capitulations can no longer be applied, and lose their reason for
existing.
Rome, 3 August.
To His Excellency the Ambassador, Count Nigra
Your Excellency has informed me that His Excellency Count Kalnoky, in
reply to the question you addressed to him in the name of His Majesty’s
government, had declared that the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian
government considers the Capitulations as inapplicable at Massowah, and
that consequently all Austro-Hungarian subjects must submit to the
legislation there prevailing.
Your Excellency is herewith instructed to inform the Imperial and Royal
Austro-Hungarian government that His Majesty’s government has taken note
of this declaration, and I also beg you to thank His Excellency Count
Kalnoky. Crispi.
In the end the endeavours made by France to induce Turkey to protest
against Italy failed completely. M. De Radowitz telegraphed on August 6
that he believed the Porte would not allow itself to be influenced by
France, and that he had declared to the Sultan that, should he make
himself the tool to France and Russia, he would no longer be able to
remain on friendly terms with the Triple Alliance.
From the diary.
A visit from Count Solms: question of passports for missionaries in
China. Germany following same policy as ourselves. She has informed the
government of the Celestial Empire that no Catholic Germans bearing
passports other than German are to be received
During the visit of the fleet to Barcelona a banquet took place at which
both the Italian Ambassador Tornielli and the French Ambassador Cambon
were present. The Spanish Minister forgot to include France in his
toast. Tornielli immediately rose and made good the omission. It was
after this toast that the Italian and French fleets drew closer
together.
28 July. –Solms expresses his hope that the Zanzibar question may be
settled peacefully. Germany has no objections to Italy’s acquiring
territory in that region. I remind him of the line of conduct pursued by
Cecchi, of the Sultan’s excuses, and express my confidence in a friendly
arrangement.
Massaua: Germany compromised in the question of rights, she having
sustained a thesis contrary to our own. She is ready to set the
Capitulations aside as long as the Italians remain at Massowah. ….
(1). Comte Charles de Muoy, Souveniers et causeries d’un diplomate,
p.256. Paris, Librairie Plon, 1909.
(2). In the volume already mentioned, on pp. 257-8, Count Muoy draws
this portrait of Goblet; ‘Serious objections to M. Goblet’s accession to
the office of Foreign Secretary had been raised in the French press. It
was said, and with reason, that this politician, although generally
esteemed a fluent orator and a clever logician, was nevertheless but
ill-adapted—thanks to his unbending and fiery temperament—to the
management of diplomatic business which he was handling for the first
time. His harsh opinions and unattractive style was commented upon. I
myself was not entirely easy to this point, and I regretted the
withdrawal of M. Flourens, whose perfect knowledge of our delicate
position at Rome, whose urbanity and sagacity, I thoroughly
appreciated.’
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